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OPINION OF THE COURT 
   
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Jeffrey Kengerski, a Captain at the Allegheny County 




a colleague had called his biracial grand-niece a “monkey” and 
then sent him a series of text messages with racially offensive 
comments about his coworkers.  Seven months later, 
Kengerski was fired.  He contends the County fired him in 
retaliation for reporting his colleague’s behavior and sued the 
County under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).  The District Court granted the County’s 
motion for summary judgment, holding that Kengerski, who is 
white, could not maintain a claim for Title VII retaliation.   
 
We disagree.  Title VII protects all employees from 
retaliation when they reasonably believe that behavior at their 
work violates the statute and they make a good-faith complaint.  
As relevant here, harassment against an employee because he 
associates with a person of another race, such as a family 
member, may violate Title VII by creating a hostile work 
environment.  Because a reasonable person could believe that 
the Allegheny County Jail was a hostile work environment for 
Kengerski, we vacate the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment. 
 
This does not mean that Kengerski will ultimately 
succeed on his retaliation claim, or even that it must survive 
summary judgment on remand.  The County claims that it fired 
him for an unrelated reason that is unquestionably serious: 
mishandling a sexual harassment claim.  We therefore remand 
to the District Court to consider whether Kengerski has 








In April 2015, Kengerski submitted a written complaint 
to Orlando Harper, Warden of the Allegheny County Jail.  This 
complaint was against Robyn McCall, a white female 
employee at the jail who had been promoted to Major in 
December 2014.  In his complaint, Kengerski detailed an event 
from over a year before (early in 2014) where he was 
discussing his grand-niece Jaylynn in the presence of then-
Captain McCall and other officers.  Kengerski told them he 
was preparing for the possibility he and his wife would take 
Jaylynn under their care because her mother was unable to 
maintain her parental responsibilities.  McCall then 
purportedly interjected: “[W]hat kind of name is Jaylynn? Is 
she black?”  J.A. at 236.  After learning that Jaylynn was 
biracial, McCall allegedly responded that Kengerski “will be 
that guy in the store with a little monkey on his hip like Sam 
Pastor [another jail employee with a biracial child].”  Id.  
Kengerski “asked her not to speak like that about [his] 
situation” and then left the room.  Id. 
 
Kengerski’s complaint also mentioned and attached 
racially offensive text messages that McCall sent to him.1  The 
District Court reviewed these messages and concluded that 
 
[t]hey were sent between February and June 
2014 and depict unflattering photographs of 
 
1 The parties at times suggest that these text messages may 
have been sent in a group chat that involved Kengerski, 
McCall, and others, though they do so only by reference to 
each others’ briefs and without record citation.  The District 




African-Americans and Asians, often repeating 
offensive stereotypes. For instance, several of 
the photographs depict overweight African-
American women, and one of the photographs 
depicts an Asian woman with enlarged teeth. 
Some of the photographs have captions 
comparing them to African-American and Asian 
employees at the jail.  
 
Kengerski v. Allegheny Cnty., 435 F. Supp. 3d 671, 674 (W.D. 
Pa. 2020).  After reporting McCall’s comment and text 
messages, Kengerski’s complaint asserts that he has “been 
harassed” and “feel[s] [he is] in a hostile environment and will 
be disciplined, harassed and possibly ridiculed by Major 
McCall on any occasion.”  J.A. at 236. Kengerski then 
concluded his complaint by detailing other managerial (but not 
explicitly racial) harassment he alleges suffering caused by 
McCall, including punitive assignment to the overnight shift.   
 
 The Warden subsequently referred Kengerski’s 
complaint to the County law department.  McCall was placed 
on administrative leave in May 2015 and resigned three months 
later.  Kengerski claims that McCall was forced to resign 
because of his complaint.  Following McCall’s resignation, 
Kengerski reported several events he considered “retaliation” 
from other officers.  J.A. at 394. 
 
In November 2015, seven months after his complaint 
and three months after McCall’s resignation, the County 
terminated Kengerski.  It claims this was after he mishandled 
 
these texts were sent in a group chat or directly to Kengerski 




a sexual harassment complaint, including allegations that he 
told two subordinate officers to lie on their reports during the 
investigation.  In this connection, the County asserts that 
Warden Harper stated Kengerski’s conduct was “more 
egregious than anything [the Warden had] seen . . . [i]n [his] 
27 years of being a correctional professional.”  J.A. at 959.  
Kengerski challenges this reason as “pretextual,” as the true 
motivation was retribution for reporting McCall and causing 
her resignation.  J.A. at 1210. 
 
In June 2017, the Equal Opportunity Employment 
Commission (EEOC) closed an investigation into Kengerski’s 
termination and issued a right-to-sue letter.  Kengerski filed 
suit two months later against Warden Harper and the jail.  The 
initial complaint included claims for violation of due process, 
race and sex discrimination, and retaliation.  An amended 
complaint filed in February 2018 continued to focus on race 
discrimination and associated retaliation under state, federal, 
and constitutional law, and also alleged retaliation for Family 
and Medical Leave Act complaints.  After amendments to the 
pleadings and rulings on subsequent motions, the only 
remaining claim was Title VII retaliation against the County.  
Kengerski, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 675.  The District Court granted 




Kengerski’s retaliation claim failed as a matter of law.  Id. at 




Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate 
against an employee “because he has opposed any practice 
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter . . . 
.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).  To survive summary judgment on 
a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must first make out a prima facie 
case.  Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 340 (3d 
Cir. 2006).3  This means that he must: “tender evidence that: 
‘(1) []he engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the 
employer took an adverse employment action against [him]; 
and (3) there was a causal connection between [his] 
participation in the protected activity and the adverse 
employment action.’”  Id. at 340-41 (quoting Nelson v. Upsala 
Coll., 51 F.3d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1995)).   
 
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The District 
Court had separate grounds for jurisdiction over a variety of 
other claims in the initial complaint.  Kengerski only appeals 
the dismissal of his Title VII retaliation claim.   
3 Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, 
after a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden of 
production shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, non-
retaliatory reason for its action against the plaintiff, and then 
the plaintiff may prevail at summary judgment only if he has 
evidence that the employer’s response is merely a pretext.  
Moore, 461 F.3d at 342; see generally McDonnell Douglas 




Here, Kengerski contends that he meets all three 
elements for a prima facie case because (1) his complaint about 
McCall was protected conduct, and (2) he was fired (3) because 
of his complaint.  Our review on appeal is plenary, which 
means we review each element anew.  Id. at 340.  We conclude 
that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment 
against Kengerski solely on the first element of the prima facie 
case.  We need not address the second element, as the County 
concedes it is satisfied by Kengerski’s termination.  And 
because the District Court has yet to decide the third element, 
on remand it may consider causation in the first instance. 
 
A. Kengerski Survives Summary Judgment on the 
First Element of His Prima Facie Case Because a 
Reasonable Person Could Believe McCall’s 
Behavior Violated Title VII. 
To satisfy the first element of his prima facie case, 
Kengerski must show that he held “an objectively reasonable 
belief, in good faith, that the activity [he opposed] is unlawful 
under Title VII.”  Moore, 461 F.3d at 341.  Kengerski opposed 
McCall’s behavior by sending a written letter to the jail’s 
warden that said he “would like to make a complaint about 
Major McCall with regards to harassment and inappropriate 
racial text messages.”  App. at 236.4  The question we ask is 
 
4 We are not persuaded by the County’s argument that 
Kengerski did not sufficiently “oppose” McCall’s racial 
comments because his letter was ambiguous or contained 
references to McCall’s managerial failings unrelated to racial 
discrimination.  We have resoundingly rejected arguments that 
additional non-discrimination claims in a complaint can 





therefore a simple one: Could a reasonable person, standing in 
Kengerski’s shoes, have believed McCall’s behavior violated 
Title VII?5   
 
Workplace behavior may violate Title VII in a variety 
of ways.  As relevant here, the Title may be violated when an 
employee’s racist behavior creates a hostile work environment 
for his colleagues.6  Still, we must be careful to distinguish 
between a hostile-work-environment claim (which Kengerski 
is not bringing) and his retaliation claim.  To succeed on the 
former, a plaintiff needs to show that the environment was 
actually hostile, i.e., that the offensive conduct at work was 
either “severe” or “pervasive.”  See Castleberry v. STI Grp., 
863 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 2017).  But for a retaliation claim a 
plaintiff need not show that his working environment in 
hindsight was actually hostile, only that he held an objectively 
reasonable belief that it was.  The difference between these two 
 
5 We leave out good faith here, as the District Court did not 
discuss that aspect of the first element, and the County does not 
meaningfully contest it on appeal.  We take no position on this 
issue. 
6 Kengerski argues that he was opposing, in addition to 
McCall’s behavior toward him, McCall’s behavior directed at 
his coworkers of other races.  In general, white plaintiffs are 
protected from retaliation when they blow the whistle on 
conduct “they reasonably perceived . . . as violative of Title 
VII” because it was hostile for their black coworkers.  Moore, 
461 F.3d at 342.  But because Kengerski’s reasonable belief 
that his own work environment was hostile satisfies the first 
element of his prima facie case, we need not consider whether 
his letter also sufficiently opposed a hostile work environment 




standards reflects a part of Title VII’s purpose to “encourage 
employees to report harassing conduct before it becomes 
severe or pervasive.”  Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 
U.S. 742, 764 (1998); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006) (explaining that the 
standard for an adverse employment action differs between 
retaliation claims and other discrimination claims because 
“differences in the purpose of the two provisions . . . justify 
this difference of interpretation”). 
 
Still, a retaliation claim must be tied to Title VII.  An 
employee must have complained about the type of conduct that 
is generally protected by that Title, such as discrimination on 
the basis of race.  This includes discrimination because of an 
employee’s association with a person of another race (such as 
a family member).  But a complaint about workplace behavior 
that is so minor and isolated that it could not “remotely be 
considered ‘extremely serious’”—that is not within some 
striking distance of an actual hostile work environment—is not 
protected because “[n]o reasonable person could have believed 
that [it] . . . violated Title VII’s standard.”  Clark County Sch. 
Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (per curiam).  Here, 
viewing McCall’s comment and her text messages together, we 
conclude that a reasonable person could have believed the jail 
was a hostile work environment for Kengerski, and thus 
violated Title VII. 
 
1. Employees Are Protected from Retaliation When 
They Reasonably Believe Their Work Environment 
Is Hostile Because of Their Association with Others. 
Amici (the United States and two Pennsylvania-based 
affiliates of the National Employment Lawyers Association) 




retaliation when he reports a work environment that he 
reasonably believes is hostile to him because of his association 
with persons of another race.  We ordinarily would not 
consider this argument, which was not raised explicitly by 
Kengerski in his opening brief, because an “amicus may not 
frame the issues for appeal.” DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 731 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Swan v. 
Peterson, 6 F.3d 1373, 1383 (9th Cir. 1993)).  Nonetheless, we 
are convinced that “substantial public interests” justify 
departing from this general rule because this issue could affect 
the behavior of countless employers and employees in 
situations ranging from interracial marriage to intra-office 
friendships.  Id.  Nor do we believe that the County will be 
“unduly prejudiced” by our consideration of this argument, 
which permeates the record in this case.  County’s Br. at 16 
n.8, 39.  The District Court considered and discussed the theory 
at length in its opinion, Kengerski’s opening brief raised the 
general substance, if not the form, of the issue by emphasizing 
the comments McCall made to him based on his association 
with his biracial grand-niece, and his reply brief “raise[d] the 
issue by reference to the amicus brief.”  Tyler v. City of 
Manhattan, 118 F.3d 1400, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997); see 
Kengerski Reply Br. at 18.  The County could—and indeed 
did—argue in its response brief against the associational 
discrimination arguments made by Amici.  Thus it was not 
prejudiced procedurally.  See United States v. Boggi, 74 F.3d 
470, 478 (3d Cir. 1996) (deviating from the general rule that 
an argument may not be raised for the first time in a reply brief 
where the other party “has had an opportunity to respond to the 
arguments raised in [the] reply brief . . . [, and the] argument 






On the merits, we agree with our sister circuits that 
associational discrimination is well grounded in the text of 
Title VII.  In a practical sense, the name is a misnomer because, 
when you discriminate against an employee because of his 
association with someone of a different race, you are in effect 
discriminating against him “because of [his own] race” in 
violation of Title VII.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).  See, e.g.,  
Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(concluding that “where an employee is subjected to adverse 
action because an employer disapproves of interracial 
association, the employee suffers discrimination because of the 
employee’s own race”); Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, 
Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 994 
(6th Cir. 1999) (“A white employee who is discharged because 
his child is biracial is discriminated against on the basis of his 
race, even though the root animus for the discrimination is a 
prejudice against the biracial child.”); Deffenbaugh-Williams 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 589 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that “a reasonable juror could find that 
Deffenbaugh was discriminated against because of her race 
(white), if that discrimination was premised on the fact that 
she, a white person, had a relationship with a black person”), 
vacated in part on other grounds, 182 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999); 
Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 
(11th Cir. 1986) (concluding that “[w]here a plaintiff claims 
discrimination based upon an interracial marriage or 
association, he alleges, by definition, that he has been 
discriminated against because of his race,” and noting 
favorably that “the EEOC, which Congress charged with 
interpreting, administering, and enforcing Title VII, has 
consistently held that an employer who takes adverse action 
against an employee or a potential employee because of an 





This theory of discrimination is not limited to close or 
substantial relationships.  While “one might expect the degree 
of an association to correlate with the likelihood of severe or 
pervasive discrimination on the basis of that association,” the 
“degree of association is irrelevant” to whether a plaintiff “is 
eligible for the protections of Title VII in the first place.”  
Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 513 (6th Cir. 2009); 
accord Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 884 
(7th Cir. 1998).  Employees thus may not be discriminated 
against because of their interracial relationships with distant 
relatives such as a grand-niece. 
 
2. A Reasonable Person Could Believe That the Jail 
Was a Hostile Work Environment for Kengerski. 
Here, McCall’s behavior was clear and consistent: she 
expressed racial animosity toward jail employees who either 
were black or associated with black persons, such as Sam 
Pastor (who raised a biracial child) and Kengerski (who was 
considering taking in his biracial grand-niece).  Therefore, we 
simply ask whether the totality of McCall’s conduct is serious 
enough that a reasonable person could conclude that 
Kengerski’s work environment was hostile. 
 
We first pause to make an important clarification about 
McCall’s standing in the jail at the time of the relevant conduct.  
The parties—including Kengerski—state that at the time of 
McCall’s comments she had not yet been promoted to Major, 
seemingly implying that at the time of this conduct she was 
Kengerski’s coworker.  But reading the record in the light most 
favorable to Kengerski compels a conclusion that McCall was 
Kengerski’s superior at the jail at the time of her offensive 




Sergeant.  See J.A. at 83 (a County personnel file showing an 
effective date of Kengerski’s promotion from Sergeant to 
Captain in September 2014); id. at 289 (the County’s statement 
of facts acknowledging that “Kengerski was promoted from 
the position of sergeant to the position of captain on September 
24, 2014”); id. at 236 (Kengerski’s complaint alleging the 
comment made by “Captain McCall” occurred “over a year” 
before April 2015 and in any case prior to the text messages); 
Kengerski, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 674 (finding that the relevant 
text messages were sent between February and June 2014).  
The County itself acknowledges this distinction in rank is 
significant: “[S]ergeants and corrections officers [a]re 
subordinate to [captains],” who are “part of management.”  
County’s Br. at 4; see also J.A. at 290 (the County’s statement 
of facts acknowledging that “sergeants are . . . not a part of 
management,” but “Captains and above are part of the Jail’s 
management team”).  This dispels framing this case as 
involving harassment by a mere coworker.7   
 
While the County incredibly attempts to argue that the 
comment about Kengerski’s grand-niece (and another jail 
employee’s child) being monkeys was merely a harmless 
“zoomorphism,” it is clear that this term was used in a racist 
manner.  County’s Br. at 17; see Kengerski, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 
679 (finding that this comment was an “offhand, yet offensive, 
remark”).  As the Fourth Circuit has recognized, “describing 
an African-American as a ‘monkey’ . . . goes far beyond the 
merely unflattering; it is degrading and humiliating in the 
 
7 We express no opinion on whether or the extent to which we 
would analyze the reasonableness of Kengerski’s complaint 





extreme.”  Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 280 (citation omitted).  
Indeed, that Court reasoned that the term “porch monkey” was 
“about as odious” as the use of the “n-word.”  Id.  
Consequently, it concluded that even two uses of that term, 
viewed as a single incident of harassment, could be found by a 
reasonable jury to be “severe enough to engender a hostile 
work environment.”  Id.  When faced with a single use of a 
racial epithet by a supervisor, we rejected the District Court’s 
conclusion that “it was unreasonable for Plaintiffs to believe 
that a single incident of a discriminatory remark . . . could 
amount to unlawful activity.”  Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 267; 
accord Rite Way, 819 F.3d at 243 (“[Retaliation] claims 
grounded in isolated comments are not always doomed to 
summary judgment.”).   
 
Still, we need not decide whether this isolated comment, 
standing alone, is enough to support a reasonable belief of a 
Title VII violation because McCall subsequently made 
numerous additional racist comments in text messages over a 
period of several months.  Though these comments did not 
directly refer to Kengerski or his grand-niece, the texts started 
coming “[n]ot long after” Kengerski stood up to McCall for 
making a racist comment about his grand-niece.  Kengerski 
thus could reasonably believe that McCall’s texts—
particularly those with racist innuendos about black persons—
were at least in part directed at him.  J.A. at 236; see generally 
Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788 (3d Cir. 
2000) (“In addressing a motion for summary judgment, the 
facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to [the non-
moving party], and []he is entitled to every reasonable 
inference that can be drawn from the record.”).  At a minimum, 
the comments made about other jail employees, at least some 




could have bolstered Kengerski’s reasonable belief that 
McCall’s conduct toward him was grounded in racial 
animosity and created a hostile work environment.  See Caver 
v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 263–64 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(although a hostile-work-environment claim may not be 
maintained “solely by pointing to comments that were directed 
at other individuals,” “evidence of those comments may be 
considered in determining whether facially neutral conduct . . . 
was actually based on [the plaintiff’s] race”); Moore, 461 F.3d 
at 345 n.6 (explaining that “racial epithets of which the targets 
were not aware may well form the basis for a reasonable belief 
that discrimination has occurred or was occurring”). 
 
We express no view whether McCall’s conduct would 
support a hostile-work-environment claim if Kengerski were to 
bring one.  But employees “are not required to collect enough 
evidence of discrimination to put the discrimination case 
before a jury before they blow the whistle.”  Moore, 461 F.3d 
at 345.  And we will not saddle the reasonable employee with 
all of the doctrinal twists and turns that a civil rights lawyer 
would need to navigate.  See E.E.O.C. v. Rite Way Serv., Inc., 
819 F.3d 235, 242 (5th Cir. 2016) (asking whether “an 
employee . . . not instructed on Title VII law[,] as a jury would 
be, [could] reasonably believe that she was providing 
information about a Title VII violation”); Boyer–Liberto v. 
Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 290 (4th Cir. 2015) (en 
banc) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“An employee is not an expert in hostile work environment 
law.”); Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that “a layperson should not be 
burdened with the ‘sometimes impossible task’ of correctly 
anticipating how a given court will interpret a particular 




reasonable employee in Kengerski’s shoes could have believed 
his work environment was hostile.8  We thus vacate the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment relying solely on the first 
element needed for a prima facie case.  
 
B. The District Court Should Address Causation in 
the First Instance. 
 
The County asks us to affirm the grant of summary 
judgment on the alternate ground that Kengerski has not shown 
a prima facie case of causation, the third element of a 
retaliation claim.  The District Court discussed causation only 
in a footnote, noting that 
 
[b]ecause the Court finds that Mr. Kengerski 
cannot demonstrate protected activity, it need not 
address the issue of causation. That said, there 
was a seven-month gap between the complaint 
and termination. Usually, courts will dismiss 
retaliation claims as a matter of law where there 
 
8 In light of this conclusion, we need not consider whether 
Kengerski’s claim may stand solely on the ground that the 
Warden perceived him as having engaged in protected activity.  
See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 571 (3d Cir. 
2002).  Nor need we decide whether a plaintiff may maintain a 
claim simply because he “reasonably believes that a hostile 
work environment is in progress.”  Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 
284; see also EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and 
Related Issues at II(A)(2)(c) (instructing that “it is protected 
opposition if the employee complains about offensive conduct 
that, if repeated often enough, would result in an actionable 




is such a long gap. See LeBoon v. Lancaster 
Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (“Although there is no bright line rule 
as to what constitutes unduly suggestive 
temporal proximity, a gap of three months 
between the protected activity and the adverse 
action, without more, cannot create an inference 
of causation and defeat summary judgment.”); 
Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 
2007) (holding five-month time period between 
complaint and first adverse action insufficient by 
itself to support inference of causation). 
 
Kengerski, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 676 n.1.  Because the District 
Court did not expressly rule on the causation issue, we “decline 
to consider [it,] . . . choosing instead to allow that court to 
consider [it] in the first instance.”  Forestal Guarani S.A. v. 
Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 401 (3d Cir. 2010).9  Of course, 
 
9 We express no view on whether Kengerski can present a 
prima facie case of causation on remand, though we note that 
the District Court’s singular focus on temporal proximity does 
not necessarily answer whether he has provided “sufficient 
[evidence] to raise the inference that [his] protected activity 
was the likely reason for the adverse [employment] action.” 
Carvalho-Grevious v. Delaware State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 259 
(3d Cir. 2017) (emphasis in original) (quotation and citation 
omitted).  While a very long delay may “suggest[], by itself, no 
causality at all,”  Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 
268, 274 (2001) (per curiam) (internal citations omitted), “[i]n 
the absence of . . . temporal proximity, we consider the 
circumstances as a whole, including any intervening 




even if Kengerski establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, 
his claim does not necessarily survive summary judgment, as 
the Court may then determine whether the County’s reason for 
Kengerski’s firing (mishandling a sexual harassment claim) is 
legitimate or pretextual.  See Moore, 461 F.3d at 342; Martinez 
v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 2021).10 
 
* * * * * 
 
 The crux of a retaliation claim is reasonableness: 
employees are protected from retaliation whenever they make 
good-faith complaints about conduct in their workplace they 
reasonably believe violates Title VII.  Here, a reasonable 
employee could believe that McCall created a hostile work 
environment, in violation of Title VII, by calling Kengerski’s 
biracial relative a “monkey” and then sending Kengerski a 
series of text messages with offensive racial stereotypes.  We 
therefore remand to the District Court to consider whether the 
County fired him because of his complaint.  
 
employer gives for its adverse action, and any other evidence 
suggesting that the employer had a retaliatory animus when 
taking the adverse action,” Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 
F.3d 181, 196 (3d Cir. 2015). 
10 We deny the County’s motion to strike these portions of 
Kengerski’s reply brief as well as its request to strike 
discussion of associational discrimination. 
